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Abstract: In this article, we seek to provide a social quality–led analysis of some of the 
conditions that led to the UK population’s collective decision to leave the European Union in 
June 2016. We draw on interview data collected between 2010 and 2012 to argue that while not 
predictable, the seeds of the Brexit vote are well rooted in the conditions experienced by many of 
the working classes in Britain’s most deprived postindustrial communities. We argue that the 
ongoing decline in economic security, effective enfranchisement, social inclusion, and social 
empowerment have all had profound consequences for working-class communities and that the 
outcome of the Brexit vote was rooted, at least in part, in their subjective experiences and 
disenchantment forged in this ongoing decline. 
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The United Kingdom European membership referendum (variously known as “the Brexit vote” 
or the EU referendum) in 2016 has, and will continue to have, significant ramifications for the 
UK and its future relationships with other nations around the world, particularly its neighbors in 
Europe. With the Leave campaign winning the vote by a margin of 52 percent to 48 percent, 
there has been a growing body of analysis of the reasons behind the vote and ramifications of it, 
with much of the analysis focusing on macro national or regional trends (see, e.g., Ashcroft 
2016; Clarke et al. 2017). Areas of the United Kingdom that have endured prolonged 
deprivation, such as in the former industrial and mining heartlands of Britain, were among the 
  
leaders of the charge to leave the EU (see Goodwin and Heath 2016). 
 One such locality can be found in Stoke-on-Trent, and with nearly 70 percent of the local 
population voting to leave, the city had one of the highest proportions of leave voters in the 
country (BBC 2016). This led to former United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) leader 
Paul Nuttall naming the city—much to the chagrin of many who live there— “the Brexit Capital 
of Britain.” This article builds on Steve Corbett’s (2016) analysis of the role of Euroscepticism, 
populism, and English nationalism in the Brexit vote, and its potential societal consequences by 
drawing on social quality theory (SQT) to provide a more in-depth region focused analysis of the 
anti-EU sentiment in the UK, its connections to the problems that people face in their daily lives 
in a neoliberal society, and its manifestation in the vote to leave the EU. In the process, this 
article will engage with one of the paradoxes at the heart of the Brexit vote. Stoke—like many 
other economically deprived, deindustrialized areas of the English Midlands and North—
received significant support from the European Union Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 
which helped to stimulate the local economy, providing employment to those sections of the 
local population most affected by economic decline, yet the local electorate still voted by a 
notable majority to leave the EU. We will explore how an analysis rooted in SQT of this 
apparent quandary can offer a more nuanced and theoretically informed understanding of the 
Brexit vote in this locality. 
Much of this article draws on a subset of interviews produced by socioculturally and 
socioeconomically precarious men during fieldwork undertaken by one of the authors from 2010 
to 2012 as part of a doctoral research project which examined experiences of unemployment and 
its’ influence on crime, identity, and social exclusion in the city. Stoke is a microcosm of a 
fundamental crisis of “social quality” (SQ) in the everyday lives of members of precarious 
  
communities across the UK and beyond. In this context, the Brexit vote in communities like 
Stoke can be seen as part of a much wider assemblage of symptomatic changes from “the rise of 
the right” (Winlow et al. 2017), the rise of independent and anti-politics movements in local 
political discourse, and growing levels of hostility toward both local and national structures of 
governance, to the decline of electoral engagement. We argue that the outcome of the vote and 
the increasing antipathy toward the EU that underpinned it—despite the unquestionable 
economic benefits to the local region derived from continued EU membership—cannot be 
simply dismissed as an irrational outburst or product of a supine and media manipulated local 
population. Rather we argue that the EU vote was a manifestation of a profound local crisis of 
the drivers for SQ in Stoke and was fueled by an upsurge in anger at the ingrained structural 
inequalities that people, and in the case of this article, men, in places like Stoke-on-Trent face 
have ultimately fed into the national vote to leave the EU.  
Given that the narratives underpinning this article predate the vote, we do not intend to 
argue that they show that “Brexit” was either inevitable or predictable. Equally, we are not 
seeking to engage with wider discussions as to whether Brexit is inherently “good” or “bad” for 
the country as a whole or for the communities that voted for it. Rather, we intend to illustrate that 
key indicators of a lack of social quality—the decline in the nature of daily circumstances for 
significant local populations with an embedded “folk memory” of dependable and secure 
employment in now departed industries, a perceived lack of effective local political 
representation, and feelings of marginalization and powerlessness—were, and continue to be, 
rooted deeply within postindustrial communities like Stoke. This lack of SQ can help us to 
explain why so many people did eventually vote to leave.  
We intend to better understand the nuances of the decision to vote to leave by situating 
  
this decision within the impacts of historic decline on the broader context of voters own 
subjective realities and their decision to ignore warnings that voting to leave would likely have a 
significant impact on the local economy and their lives as a whole. In doing so, we seek to offer 
a counterpoint to dominant narratives that suggest that working-class Brexit voters are a 
homogenous, uneducated, lazy, and easily led mass who uncritically consumed and regurgitated 
emotive and potentially misleading Leave campaign messages, narratives, and slogans. While the 
decision of many Stoke residents to vote to leave the EU may not appear rational to an outside 
observer who might assume that the path out of the challenges faced by Stoke and similar 
communities is largely economic, such decisions and votes are entirely rational when 
considering the broader subjective experiences and attitudes of these individuals that concern 
topics of social recognition and responsiveness (as crucial elements of SQ), thus causing the lack 
of SQ, that are in many respects prefigured in the pre-Brexit vote interviews examined here.  
Moreover, while addressing a microcosm of the UK population and the impacts that a 
lack of social quality has had on them, their lives, views, experiences, and potential reasons to 
vote for Brexit, there are significant international ramifications for these findings—not least 
because of the significant change to the UK’s relationship with its closest geographical and 
trading partners. There is growing inequality, marginalization, protectionism, and 
disenfranchisement around the world, particularly in the West. This has seen the rise of populism 
in many countries, the near election of Marine Le Pen of the Front National in France, the 
election of President Donald Trump in the United States, a right-wing populist-led coalition in 
Austria, and right-wing governments being elected in Poland and Hungary, among others. By the 
end of this article, we hope that it will be apparent that continual failures to tackle the lack of 
social quality, as experienced in the daily lives of disadvantaged, excluded, and marginalized 
  
populations across the West, may continue to spur similar populist anti-EU manifestations 
elsewhere in Europe, and new populist manifestations in the UK in the period leading up to and 
in the aftermath of Brexit. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Originally proposed as a standard by which to judge the quality of everyday experiences and 
interactions of European citizens (Walker 2005: 44), the SQ approach is defined as “the extent to 
which people are able to participate in societal based relationships under conditions which 
enhance their well-being, capacities and potential” (Van der Maesen and Walker 2012a: 68). It 
takes as its starting point the fact that people are social beings, rather than atomized, utilitarian, 
economic actors as they are often reduced to under economically focused approaches, and that 
interactions with wider collective identities inform the individual’s development (Walker 2015). 
Achieving SQ is not simply a case of participation, but rather “a form of participation in which 
people are able to shape their own circumstances and contribute to societal development in such 
a way that it will further social justice, solidarity, equal value and human dignity” (Beck et al. 
2012: 69). It is not enough to enfranchise people and provide the illusion of them influencing the 
outcome of events and societal changes. Rather, they should be genuinely involved and able to 
have a real impact on what unfolds and its impact on their life at all levels—from work, to civic 
engagement, to local and national enfranchisement. 
Peter Herrmann and colleagues (2012: 70) suggest that SQT provides us with a tool to 
consider the role and impact of a manifold of societally oriented policies and its influence on 
major trends, contradictions, and challenges within society. The approach, which seeks to 
understand the complex nature of society along both local and global lines, is underpinned by 
  
three sets of factors: constitutional factors that influence the individual’s self-realization and 
ability to develop bonds in secure, stable, and understandable contexts of rules and rights; 
conditional factors addressing socioeconomic security, social cohesion, inclusion, and 
empowerment; and normative factors that emphasize the need for social justice (equity), 
solidarity, equal value, and human dignity (see Beck et al. 2012: 56–66). These combine to 
provide the foundations for “a decent society” (Abbott et al. 2016) that enfranchises and engages 
citizens in an active, meaningful way and is premised on the idea that four conditional factors are 
met (Walker 2005: 44). While not providing an entirely sufficient understanding of the 
complexities of the collective factors, SQ can help to understand their features and relationship 
in a specific place and time (Herrmann 2015: 83). 
Pamela Abbott and colleagues (2016) suggest that there is no model “decent society”: all 
are lacking in something whether that be full enfranchisement of the populace, political 
corruption, marginalized and excluded populations, and/or a lack of cohesion; all societies are 
continually developing with some exhibiting greater levels of SQ than others. However, even 
within nations that may, at first glance, possess high levels of SQ, it is possible to see complex 
patterning of differential levels of SQ within communities with some lacking along multiple 
measures. This was evident in many of the interviews that this article draws on, and we argue 
that Stoke-on-Trent is archetypal in this regard insomuch as it is lacking in all four key 
indicators. 
 
Methodology 
Eighteen men took part in the original study on which this article draws, each participating in at 
least two in-depth qualitative interviews lasting between 30 minutes and three hours. Senses of 
  
space, place, and belonging were significant in the participants’ narratives, so triangulation 
activities involving visiting significant locations, or viewing them on maps and online where 
visits were impractical, were also undertaken. This was done with the aim of both improving the 
quality of the data but also to help better situate their experiences and elicit hidden details that 
would otherwise not have been shared and thus helped to enrich the depth of detail that informed 
the wider project and subsequent analyses (King and Horrocks 2010). These in-depth interviews 
help to chart the changing circumstances and perceptions of participants over this period and 
belie emerging concerns, beliefs, practices, and attitudes about core constitutional factors 
(personal human security, social recognition, social responsiveness, and personal (human) 
capacity) of which they are deprived because of the nature, and lack of, conditional factors and 
which were to go on to underpin the significant Brexit vote in this locality in 2016. 
 
The “Brexit” Quandary 
At the heart of the “Staffordshire Potteries,” during its heyday, Stoke-on-Trent was home to 
much of the UK ceramics industry and developed a global reputation for its earthenware and 
bone china ranges thanks to the likes of Spode, Portmeirion, and Wedgwood. It was also home to 
a host of other industries key the areas development including coal and steelworks, their own 
fortunes often intertwined with the pottery industry. The city’s population went into ongoing 
decline following its peak in 1931 (OHPR 1931: 2) and has only recently begun to recover (ONS 
2012). While it has experienced growing levels of migration, at the 2011 census the city still had 
a higher-than-average proportion of white British residents—more than 88 percent compared 
with a national average of 80.5 percent (Stoke-on-Trent City Council 2014)—rising to more than 
95 percent in some communities, including Bentilee, one of the city’s most disadvantaged 
  
communities (CDRC 2015). As will be explored later, this is highly significant in the formation 
of some of the experiences of several of the men interviewed and the narratives that they create.  
 The industries that formerly dominated the skyline have been in long-term decline, and 
now only a handful of pot banks remain. The coal mines and steelworks have all closed, leaving 
a patchwork of former close-knit mining and steel communities across Stoke. The ceramics 
industry, which in the mid-twentieth century employed almost 100,000 people in Stoke, only 
accounted for 9,000 jobs by 2010, having shed 20,000 jobs in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century alone (Lowenstein 2017). Echoing changes that have occurred across former industrial 
heartlands across the UK, there has been a corresponding decline in the labor opportunities for 
many in the city. These elements combined, along with poor educational and health outcomes 
frequently associated with postindustrial cities struggling to reinvent themselves, have seen 
Stoke regularly finding itself among the most deprived in the country, being ranked joint 13th 
most deprived in the most recent Indices of Multiple Deprivation (DCLG 2015). In parallel to 
these changes (again echoing changes across many deindustrialized areas across the UK) Stoke, 
once a stronghold for the Labour Party in both national and local politics, now displays a much 
more fragmented political identity. 
Since New Labour’s election in 1997, there has been an ongoing decline in the proportion 
of people voting across the city, with Labour experiencing a prolonged decline in its vote share 
on a local and national level in one of its former industrial heartlands. The far-right British 
National Party (BNP) won several council seats in Stoke in 2009, and although there are now no 
BNP councilors in Stoke, the administration of the local City Council is (at the time of writing) 
in the hands of a coalition of Conservatives and independents (including several former BNP 
councilors) with Labour, the largest party in the chamber, sitting in opposition. In the 2017 
  
general election, Labour lost one of the three Stoke Parliamentary constituencies—Stoke 
South—to the Conservatives after an 80-year dominance of all Stoke Parliamentary seats. This 
systemic socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and sociocultural fragmentation and crisis in Stoke 
echoes events in many similar communities, and this trend has been documented widely (see, 
e.g., Charlesworth 2000; Mahoney and Kearon 2017; Winlow et al. 2017) and is indicative of the 
fact that the city and its population are sorely lacking across all measures of SQ—in particular, 
the requisite conditional factors. 
A key issue underpinning the city’s decline is a lack of investment from private or public 
bodies. Like many other Northern, Midland, and Welsh postindustrial conurbations, the EU is 
one of the only reliable sources of funding that Stoke-on-Trent and the wider Staffordshire and 
North Staffordshire regions have been able to draw on. The area has benefited from significant 
investment from the ERDF with the 2014–2020 phase of ERDF support alone being worth in the 
region of £83 million for the wider Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire Local Enterprise 
Partnership (Stoke-on-Trent & Staffordshire Enterprise Partnership 2018). In contrast, the city 
has endured substantial budget and funding cuts under the coalition and subsequent Conservative 
governments’ austerity programs. For instance, its Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder, Renew 
North Staffordshire, which was intended to regenerate large swathes of the city’s often poor-
quality, squalid Victorian housing stock, was canceled in 2010, leaving derelict houses across the 
city, and the City Council will have seen “savings” of more than £200 million made between 
2010 and 2020 when we leave the EU (Stoke-on-Trent City Council 2017). These experiences 
are not isolated, and, like other deprived postindustrial cities in England and Wales, the populace 
still overwhelmingly voted to leave the EU—the very source of the limited economic support 
that has come in to the region, and the city of Stoke-on-Trent was one of the leaders of the Brexit 
  
charge. 
The result of all this was more than 65 percent of Stoke-on-Trent’s voting age population 
turning out to vote, of which 69.4 percent voted for Brexit; by comparison, Stoke-on-Trent 
Central had just 38.2 percent of eligible voters casting their vote in a high-profile, nationally 
covered parliamentary by-election in February 2017 (Batchelor 2017). Thus, when comparing 
electoral turnout for the EU vote with other elections, the opportunity to vote against EU 
membership appeared to galvanize the electorate, challenging the caricature of the working 
classes as being a lazy, dysfunctional, feckless, disengaged mass. Subsequent attempts to explain 
this apparent quandary have arguably been dominated by simplistic and superficial popular 
analysis. 
There is some growing recognition of the fact that there are more complex, deep-rooted, 
structural challenges experienced in deprived, formerly (and in some instances still) proud 
postindustrial communities that have challenged the worldview of those who live and are 
brought up in them (see, e.g., Corbett 2016; Goodwin and Heath 2016; Peston 2017; Winlow et 
al. 2017). Many retain conventional aspirations that are rooted in a meritocratic ideal (see 
Mahoney and Kearon 2017) but lack the constitutionali tools and opportunities to achieve them. 
Their experiences are compounded by failed promises by politicians who are seen as favoring 
other groups, particularly migrants, over their own needs and experiences. This is not a new 
phenomenon, and the anger, sense of abandonment, and despair that is prefigured in the 
interviews conducted in Stoke before the Brexit vote has arguably been growing throughout the 
period of systemic deindustrialization and rapid decline of the social democratic consensus in 
local and national governance, as is exhibited throughout the narratives we draw on here. 
  
  
Analysis 
The prolonged decline in the city’s fortunes and an inability to reinvent itself have had a 
profound impact on the lives and expectations of many of its residents, and these in turn 
manifested themselves, at least in part, in the collective vote to leave the European Union on 
what we now know to be 29 March 2019. This broader, systemic crisis is reflected at the level of 
personal biography and individual perceptions and attitudes in a series of longitudinal interviews 
with unemployed and precariously employed working-class men in Stoke-on-Trent. We have 
documented elsewhere some of the coping strategies that these young men developed to try to 
mitigate the worst excesses of their exclusion from mainstream society, including turning to 
petty crime and the formation of new forms of individual and collective self-identity and 
identification to help them “get by” (see Mahoney and Kearon 2017). A key issue underpinning 
people’s experiences in the city—particularly those with little or no education, and patchy 
employment records at best—is their ability to engage effectively in the workforce. Among those 
who took part in the original study, all had contemporary experiences of unemployment and the 
challenges that it posed to them emotionally, physically, and mentally, as well as to their 
engagement with their support networks and the wider community.  
Mohammed, for instance, had a particularly complicated narrative. He was not British 
Asian but rather a 23-year-old white, working-class man who chose his own pseudonym with the 
express intention of seeking to draw attention to racial tensions in both his own views and the 
wider city. He had struggled to gain secure, meaningful work, something fundamental to not just 
his economic security but also his ability to participate fully and effectively in society or to 
“actively influence the immediate and more distant [societal] and physical environment in which 
[he lives]” (Abbott et al. 2016: 72). This is not uncommon; the transference of risk onto 
  
individuals under the neoliberal socioeconomic model has seen a rise in flexible working 
practices and a loss of secure and stable work (Braverman [1974]1998; Standing 2011). Those 
who lack the skills to gain secure, meaningful work because of an inability to adapt to the 
changing nature of work in contemporary society find themselves further marginalized through a 
reliance on the welfare state and the stigma that it carries (Anderson and Guillemard 2005), 
becoming cast as a passive consumer of state support rather than as an active and empowered 
member of the community. Mohammed felt disempowered and, while accepting the role of 
political decisions on his experiences and those of others like him, retained strong views on 
minority populations, which he sought to legitimize through arguing that they did not understand 
what it was to be British and lacked respect for British “heritage”:  
 
Dirty bastards, dirty bastards. I don’t like their morals. Don’t like how they treat people, 
and then they can go around burning poppies!  . . . That’s our heritage and you’re going 
burning poppies in front of our fucking dead soldiers! Fuck off! Pisses me off, but they 
let it go on and on and on and on and on  . . . As soon as we let ’em [them] in, we go 
across there to go and help their country out and they fucking cut our heads off. 
(Mohammed, 23) 
 
Mohammed conflates migration, particularly from predominantly Islamic countries, with Islamic 
fundamentalism, and he was not alone in doing this, although it was not the dominant narrative 
for many who took part in the study. Rather, wider discussions on migration, including among 
Mohammed’s other remarks, focused on the impact on competition for employment. There was 
an awareness that high levels of migration were not the fault of the migrant workers, but rather 
  
arose as a result of political decisions: 
 
Mrs. Thatcher, she invested in what they called “the Commonwealth of the People”  . . . 
Foreigners, and we’ve paid for that ever since. And now you look at it, they’re all 
plowing in. They’re nicking [from] their own, they’re stealing from our kids. (Pickles, 
48) 
 
Such views were, however, often further complicated by a grudging respect for migrant workers: 
 
We’re letting all these immigrants in the country as well, and they’re taking all the jobs, 
you know what I mean? I wouldn’t have to resort to crime.  . . . There’s no jobs around 
because there’s so many immigrants working for fuck all. That is who they employ. And 
they’re good at it as well! If it was stuck just to English-bred people, no immigration in 
the country whatsoever, everyone would be on a 30 or 40K [thousand pound] a year job 
at least. (Spanish, 25) 
 
Like the participants in Simon Winlow and colleagues’ (2017) recent work, the reality of the 
experiences of these men and others like them is much more complex than the racist caricature 
that could be drawn from Mohammed’s original remarks. Despite such racial undertones, some 
of the concerns were legitimate. It has been recognized elsewhere that postindustrial 
communities have borne the brunt of migration, asylum, and refugee placements in recent years 
with little state support for either them or the existing population, which has resulted in further 
competition for work with fractures arising within communities (Corbett 2016; Hacking 2015).  
  
 The underlying tensions and divisions in the communities, compounded by a loss of 
meaningful work and profound sense of disconnectedness have led to some viewing their 
communities as their own defensible spaces—the divisions in society becoming more 
pronounced as a result. When asked about his own community, Mohammed stated: 
 
It’s pretty much all right. There’s a couple of Blacks around here an [and] a couple of 
Pakis. A Paki at the shop up the top an’ a couple of Pakis who live around here—you 
don’t see much of them. There’s about three Paki families that live on Bentilee. Blacks 
are starting emerging over here, yeah  . . . they keep themselves to themselves . . . Don’t 
mind the Blacks but, it’s just the Pakis. I don’t like them. Even the Blacks hate the Pakis. 
Even the Indians hate Pakis! (Mohammed, 23) 
 
The homogeneity of the community, alongside its traditional working-class roots, has seen the 
development of strong bonds and ties to the community among residents. Mohammed’s mother 
and friends continued to live on the estate, providing strong informal bonds enabling him to get 
by. These bonds, which previously tied communities together, are, however, challenged by the 
atomizing nature of contemporary society. The upshot of this is that there is the development of a 
sense of melancholic nostalgia as people hark back to a mythical golden age, and this seeps into 
the narratives of these men. As we have argued elsewhere, “on the one hand [they were] all too 
conscious of the local collective memories and mythologies of close knit working class 
communities and the employment that delivered social and economic security as well as a sense 
of status and place to those communities. On the other hand, they lived a far more fragile and 
precarious existence” (Mahoney and Kearon 2017: 78). 
  
 The development of “bonding capital” (see Leonard 2004; Putnam 2001) has traditionally 
been identified as a strength of working-class communities, rooting their identity in space and 
place, yet it can also trap people in their community and circumstances (Abbott et al. 2016). 
While developing a strong sense of belonging and ability to “get by,” people struggle to develop 
wider networks and lack the bridging capital to “get on” (see MacDonald et al. 2005). This can 
result in the development of localized norms and countercultural attitudes (Abbott et al. 2016) 
that embed people in space and place (see, e.g., Ilan 2011, 2013) and, while helping to deal with 
the immediate challenges people face, simultaneously weakens the bonds with wider social 
norms (see Willis 1977).  
 Alternatively, some can develop nihilistic outlooks on life: 
 
I won’t get far in life. I’ll just be plodding along til I die to be honest, mate. I mean, you 
never know, I might win the lottery. You never know. You got more chance of fuckin’ . . 
. well, you’ve got more chance with the lottery. (Mohammed, 23) 
 
I’m stuck in a rut, I can’t get out of it. . . . Most of us on this estate’d say the same thing, 
there’s only one way out of it [intimates blowing his head off with a gun]. That’s why 
half of these on here are on smack. They do it to shut the world out ’cause there’s fuck all 
else there for them anyway. (Pickles, 48) 
 
These attitudes, characterized here by a sense of abandonment and getting “stuck in a rut” and 
echoed elsewhere, belie a sense that there is little left to live or work for. Some sought to mask 
this:  
  
 
I’ve not really had much motivation, especially the last few weeks ’cause of what I 
believe’s gonna happen on Friday, and it’s like, what’s the point? Why get a job, why get 
happy, and then get it all taken away? I know it’s a bit of a daft thing. A lot of people 
don’t believe in it and think I’m stupid, but I kinda [kind of] do believe it’s gonna happen 
so kinda ruins any motivation to do anything at the moment. (Hatman, 26) 
 
Hatman was discussing the theory that the world was going to end on 21 December 2012 in line 
with a Mayan prophecy as we crossed from the end of an aeon. His motivation did not, however, 
change following this. These nihilistic ideas were ingrained within his psyche. The lack of 
opportunities to escape the precarious, ontologically, and economically insecure circumstances 
that dominate the communities of Stoke-on-Trent have left some questioning the point of their 
existence. In developing such nihilistic beliefs and practices, there becomes little point in 
deferring gratification for the long term and, as a result, little interest in the risks of longer-term 
pain, as was the message of “Project Fear” deployed by the Remain campaign in the EU 
referendum. Indeed, for Nietzsche (1967: 11–18) fear is a normal condition. These developments 
undermine already-weak bonds between disparate groups in society, with the result being that 
“there is no solidarity in which there are sterile, unproductive and destructive elements.” (33). 
Bulent Diken (2009: 5) further develops this by drawing attention to the fact that “contemporary 
society systematically produces ‘losers’ while, at the same time, depicting this condition as a 
fate, as one’s own fault.” Thus, through individualizing failure, the bonds that formerly acted as 
a foundation for wider solidarities break down, and people become further isolated from 
societally based relationships. This view is echoed in the work of Charis Kubrin and colleagues 
  
(2006), who examined the political, cultural, and emotional responses of young, urban African 
American males experiencing significant disadvantage rooted in deindustrialization, a situation 
that generated significant nihilistic responses, often culminating in suicide.  
Pickles shows us that, while he had adopted a nihilistic view on the world that fed 
through into short-term thinking and propensity to engage in crime and deviance, it would 
require very little to achieve his aspirations:  
 
I woke up one morning, I’m in that place, my life’s so down and low, I thought, ‘What 
have I got to lose?’ Because that’s the point: I’ve just answered the question. What have I 
got to lose anyway? If [only] you had something that was there at the beginning that was 
worth hanging on to . . . just a nice job that was a safety net and the wages were over two 
hundred, three hundred pounds a week. (Pickles, 48)  
 
These men are trapped by space and place, and it is of little wonder that nihilistic views become 
embedded in the psyche. People in such circumstances experience the paradox of being included 
in their community but excluded from wider decision-making processes; decisions are made on 
their behalf by those who claim to know better, with the consequences thrust on them. It is of 
little surprise that there is such a profound disconnect between the experiences and attitudes of 
people in deprived communities, such as are characterized by those in Stoke-on-Trent, and those 
of the liberal middle classes and elite. 
 The remarks, attitudes, and actions above sit in stark contrast to the narratives provided 
by liberal think tanks, research institutes, many academics, and much of the political 
establishment that have consistently extolled the virtues of migration (see, e.g., Cameron 2013; 
  
Devlin et al. 2014; Reed and Latorre 2009) and membership of the European Union. Following 
the opening of UK borders to Accession 8 countries in 2004, there was a significant increase in 
migration to the UK. This coincided with ongoing decline, worklessness, and deprivation in 
postindustrial communities, all while the country continued to prosper—at least while prosperity 
is measured by GDP, the use of which as a measure of progress, has previously been identified 
as problematic (see Abbott et al. 2016: 8–11; Herrmann 2015, Stiglitz et al. 2009).  
Critics argue that GDP is a reductionist measure that assumes continual economic growth 
is a good thing. It is underpinned by the tacit premise that the benefits of this growth are shared 
throughout society—something untrue in a neoliberal society and thus something that ignores the 
subjective experiences of people and the plight of marginalized groups (see also Abbott et al. 
2016; Van der Maesen and Walker 2012a). This is exacerbated by a growing body of evidence 
showing that increasing numbers of people are trapped in in-work poverty (Wright 2018), 
thereby emphasizing that the type and quality of work, rather than having a job in the first 
instance, is of utmost significance. Moreover, in measuring societal progress by GDP, effective 
SQ initiatives are a condition sine qua non to go beyond the restricted socioeconomic and 
financial policies (Walker 2005). This has compounded the experience of marginalized, 
precarious, and excluded populations across Europe and, in this instance, within many of the 
UK’s postindustrial urban hubs such as Stoke. By championing immigration as an economic 
good, politicians from across much of the center-left to center-right have ignored the impact of 
policy decisions on working-class communities and have created space for “anti-politics” 
movements to flourish.  
There is a clear tension between the view that migration is economically beneficial and 
an overall good, and the realities faced by these men, which is reflected in their attitudes and 
  
narratives. However, to reduce depictions of these men to those of illiberal, uneducated, racist, 
white working classes as frequently occurs in much media and political discourse provides an 
inherently divisive and problematic situation in which the white working classes are constructed 
as scapegoat and passive dupe. This narrative (that these men themselves are all too aware of) 
reinforces the sense of disenfranchisement within significant sections of the city’s population. 
This pervasive sense of disenfranchisement from and disillusionment with the political process 
was profound and deeply embedded with many commenting on the cyclical nature of attacks on 
the poor, vulnerable, and dispossessed. At the same time, much of the palpable anger among 
these men was undirected, and it is apparent that there was a lack of an effective outlet through 
which to express themselves:  
 
I try not to watch like the news, it just pisses me off, like with fuckin’ [former British 
Prime Minister] David Cameron. I hate the bastard! All the stuff, everything he says is 
just wrong, innit [isn’t it]? Any quotes you hear on tele, they’re just wrong like that. 
[Author: Any specific examples?] I can’t think of any off me head at the moment but just 
everything you hear  . . . his view on like poorer people or asylum seekers, it’s just, it’s 
just all wrong, everything you ever hear off him. I’d just rather he were dead. I would. 
Like, I don’t try and have much to do with political shit, but this David Cameron is a 
dick. (Darren, 23, emphasis added) 
 
This declining trust of the political elite and public institutions, echoed across the general 
population (Edelman 2018), is symptomatic of a breakdown in trust and social cohesion between 
individuals and communities (Abbott et al. 2016: 37). There is a perception that there is a lack of 
  
a shared morality or common goals (38) highlighted by Darren’s comment on Cameron’s views 
on “poorer people and asylum seekers” and that the elite no longer have the interests of the 
whole of society at heart. 
 Darren’s inability to articulate specifics as to the source of his anger was not uncommon; 
one participant, 21-year-old AJ, lacked any real confidence in himself or his opinion, repeatedly 
saying, “I don’t really know what to say anymore” and “I can’t get my words out.” While this 
may point toward a lack of formal education (he left school with no formal qualifications at 15), 
others with similar or lower levels of education were at least able to articulate their sense of 
anger. Rather, such statements suggest a lack of a “voice” on a personal, local, and national 
level.  
Effective and meaningful representation is necessary to achieve empowerment in a 
decent society (Abbott et al. 2016), with a lack of voice leading to tensions and division as 
people feel that their interests are not being considered or advanced. The SQ approach argues 
that solidarities are fundamental to the human experience and in maintaining bonds between 
individuals. Historically, unionization was vital in ensuring that exploited working classes were 
represented in the workplace, providing solidarity and training so that they were better placed to 
represent themselves and their communities at a local and national level. It also provided 
significant organizing capacity, but attacks on the labor movement and unions since the 1970s 
have left them fragmented. As a result, “unemployed and casualized workers, having suffered a 
blow to their capacity to project themselves into the future . . . are scarcely capable of being 
mobilized” (Bourdieu 1998: 82–83). They are now even less able to represent themselves and 
their own interests in a political world dominated by a self-reinforcing elite. SQ approaches, 
however argue, that we should not just focus on preserving older solidarities such as those 
  
described above that have been under increasing pressure in neoliberal Britain, but rather 
acknowledge that new solidarities should be found to replace those that are weakening (Beck et 
al. 2012: 63). Space for alternative groups with populist, divisive messages opens up where new 
solidarities—meaningful and cohesive alternatives involving effective participation, 
empowerment, and representation—fail to materialize. Such opportunities have not gone 
unnoticed by populist “anti-politics” groups, as exhibited by the previously noted rise of the 
BNP, UKIP, and “independent” groups in the city 
These groups have tapped into growing deprivation and disenchantment to develop 
narratives that apportion blame for the postindustrial decline of the city to migrant groups, 
established political “elites,” or a combination of the two. Emotive sentiments and narratives 
surrounding race and migration, which often colored many of the Brexit debates, are well rooted 
in the data here, with the underlying anger predating even the coalition and Conservative 
governments’ austerity programs. 
 Such narratives tap into objectless anxieties fueled by the ontological insecurity 
experienced by white working-class groups and communities, providing them with a voice and 
sense of unity and solidarity. Crucially, however, these views are complex and preexisting. 
Populist messages are not simply internalized and regurgitated, but rather seize an opportunity to 
exploit the gap created by the apparent abandonment of Labour’s traditional industrial heartlands 
by New Labour as the party was seen to embrace neoliberalism and globalization. In providing a 
voice and targeted narrative for those most affected by it, populist groups amplify wider 
dissatisfaction at the impact of migration and deprivation. Rather than casting unemployment 
and an inability to “get on” as being a personal failing as per the dominant “meritocratic” 
discourse, populist groups return to the idea of them being social ills, albeit caused not by the 
  
neoliberal economic model but rather by migrant workers and populations. These groups 
generate new senses of solidarity and cohesion, but it is not at a national or supranational level 
(although similar movements exist elsewhere, and in particular throughout Europe). Rather, they 
create and reinforce “in-groups,” casting those who do not share their values or priorities as 
stigmatized “out-groups” against which they define themselves (Tyler 2013; Young 1999, 2007). 
While this may be a politically expedient approach for populist groups to take insomuch as it 
enables them to further their own agenda, it ultimately sows discord and division, weakening 
cohesion and undermining attempts at creating an inclusive society.  
 Such an approach fails to tackle the real problems surrounding the ever more precarious 
nature of the low-skilled work that many of these men are relegated to. They do not possess the 
qualifications to advance into more secure, better-paid roles, and the service industries do not 
offer the sense of purpose and well-being that they seek. The threat of further automation looms 
in the background, and it is the low and semiskilled in society most at risk. At present, it is 
unclear as to where Brexit will take us, not least because at the time of writing there is no clear 
vision of Brexit. Migrants, travelers, and marginalized working-class elements of the population 
have historically found themselves excluded from societally based relationships and cast as 
abject outsiders and still do (Tyler 2013). What remains to be seen is who will be viewed as the 
next scapegoat should the prophesized return to the golden ages of old fail to materialize. 
 
Conclusion 
In many respects, the arguments outlined in this article are critically engaging with the fact that 
many journalists, pundits, politicians, and other commentators on the state of the former 
industrial heartlands of Britain don’t really know how to conceptualize the “left behind,” 
  
marginalized, and disaffected communities that have informed our work here. For many years, 
they have been regarded as passive and disengaged: if only they would engage with the 
democratic process, turn out and vote more, then they would be able to exercise more control 
over their situation. But when they did turn out to vote in large numbers, they voted for Brexit. In 
the process, they have transitioned from being regarded as too disengaged, lazy, and feckless, to 
becoming passive dupes of Brexit propaganda who cannot be trusted to evaluate the evidence put 
to them and come up with the reasoned, rational conclusion that the only sensible choice was to 
remain in the European Union. Both sets of depictions are wholly problematic insomuch as they 
remove any suggestion of such voters being rational, agentic actors and, furthermore, ignore the 
subjective realities faced by those living in deprived, postindustrial communities across the UK. 
It is with this in mind that we have drawn on SQT to develop a more nuanced and critical 
understanding of some of the factors that underpinned the vote to leave the EU. 
“Social Quality provides a complex methodological and analytical framework for 
describing and explaining the quality of society, explicitly challenging the view that economic 
growth alone inevitably results in a higher quality of [daily] life for individuals and societies” 
(Abbott and Wallace 2012: 155). We suggest that in SQ, subjective satisfaction is a key element 
of the quality of societal circumstances and provides the basis for understanding the constitution 
of a livable society. This subjective satisfaction will be highly influenced by the state of affairs 
of the conditional factors of social quality in a complex interrelationship that we have tried to 
summarize in Figure 1.  
 
<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE> 
Figure 1: The “square” of social quality—systemic absences in Stoke (adapted from Abbott and 
  
Wallace 2012). 
 
The experiences of our research participants demonstrate a relative underdevelopment of 
the four conditional factors, and because of this, people in Stoke-on-Trent lack the means to fully 
realize the constitutive factors of personal security, social recognition, social responsiveness, and 
personal capacity. This in turn prevents the future fulfillment of the conditions of social quality 
within the city without broader societal level changes, which should be predicated on fulfilling 
the normative factors of social justice, solidarity, equal value, and human dignity. We suggest, 
therefore, that the conditions of SQ in Stoke-on-Trent played at least some role in people’s 
decision to vote to Leave the European Union, and this has implications for the social quality 
architecture (Beck et al. 2012).  
As indicated in Figure 1, the ingrained deprivation and decline experienced within towns 
and cities like Stoke-on-Trent means that there are consistently low levels of economic security, 
social cohesion, social inclusion, and social empowerment—core conditional components of a 
“decent society.” Underpinned by chronic economic insecurity, there is considerable 
fragmentation of identities on a geographical level as the city continues to struggle to reinvent 
itself following prolonged postindustrial decline, as well as on an individual level among those 
who find themselves living in deprived, marginalized communities. The result is growing 
personal insecurity as people struggle to get on in neoliberal Britain and no longer feel the same 
sense of collectivity and belonging, while populist groups capitalize on this to sow further 
discord, weakening social cohesion in the process. The offer of populist groups that saw the 
city’s population as “resentful, angry, looking for a new politics” (Barton 2009) provided an 
articulable narrative and somebody to blame. This made for a powerful, uniting force and, for the 
  
first time in a long time, a voice on the national level as they provide a sense of both social 
recognition and solidarity. The space for these groups and the powerful sense of imagined 
cohesion that their messages offer was forged in the ongoing decline, deprivation, and 
marginalization that communities, epitomized by Stoke-on-Trent, face.  
ERDF and related EU funding helped to a limited extent to plug one of these holes—
economic insecurity, however, due to wider policy failings in the UK that funding has done little 
more than papering over the cracks. The fact that the other three cornerstones of the conditional 
factors of SQ are increasingly attenuated in Stoke-on-Trent has seen a rise in divisions and a 
perception among much of the city’s population that their needs are, and will continue to go, 
unmet by an out-of-touch political elite who do not fully understand the ramifications of their 
actions on the population of the city and areas like it. 
The problematic nature of conditional factors, as demonstrated throughout this article, 
mean that future aspirations for self-realization are constrained by the circumstances faced in the 
present. For people in such a situation, the referendum on leaving the European Union on 23 
June 2016 provided a chance to have their say on something that had the potential to attract real 
change. Their decision was not motivated solely by racism, ignorance, and a lack of critical 
faculties as has been suggested elsewhere. Nor was it solely motivated by a desire to bloody the 
nose of an out-of-touch elite, although as has subsequently been seen there have been significant 
ramifications from the vote (not least for David Cameron, who stood down the day after the vote, 
or former Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, who was unceremoniously removed 
from office by the next Prime Minister Teresa May). Rather, they were, for the first time in 
decades, able to have a say in the direction of the country’s political future. They felt empowered 
to “take back control,” which in turn provided a sense of personal capacity through exercising 
  
their democratic rights in a meaningful way, being actively empowered and engaged in 
participatory democracy.  
The interview narratives discussed here are not used to explain the Brexit vote; they 
cannot. The referendum was only offered as part of the Conservative Party manifesto in 2015, 
three years after the last of these narratives was collected. Nor do we seek to excuse the racism 
that is shared within some of the narratives. Rather, we have sought to show that the conditions 
underpinning Brexit (including unresponsive and chronically underfunded public institutions on 
both a local and national level), themselves a manifestation of the distinct lack of SQ in the city, 
are deeply ingrained in not just the geography of the city but also its people. In a city such as 
Stoke-on-Trent, which has seen a dramatic erosion in its status and that of its citizens whose 
experiences are underpinned by a distinct lack of SQ, when confronted with a choice between 
continuity that further compounds one’s marginality, and change that, no matter how unlikely or 
uncertain, provides a glimmer of hope for a different future, it should not be surprising that 
people chose the latter (Peston 2017). 
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Note 
i Cf. Beck et al. 2012. We use “constitutional” here to refer to forms and sources of 
personal/human/ontological security, sources of social recognition, aspects of social 
responsiveness, and personal/human capacity to respond to change and challenge. 
                                                          
